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Abstract
We develop a model for the evolution of wealth in a non-conservative economic
environment, extending a theory developed in [13]. The model considers a system of
rational agents interacting in a game theoretical framework. This evolution drives
the dynamic of the agents in both wealth and economic configuration variables. The
cost function is chosen to represent a risk averse strategy of each agent. That is, the
agent is more likely to interact with the market, the more predictable the market,
and therefore the smaller its individual risk. This yields a kinetic equation for an
effective single particle agent density with a Nash equilibrium serving as the local
thermodynamic equilibrium. We consider a regime of scale separation where the
large scale dynamics is given by a hydrodynamic closure with this local equilibrium.
A class of generalized collision invariants (GCIs) is developed to overcome the dif-
ficulty of the non-conservative property in the hydrodynamic closure derivation of
the large scale dynamics for the evolution of wealth distribution. The result is a
system of gas dynamics-type equations for the density and average wealth of the
agents on large scales. We recover the inverse Gamma distribution, which has been
previously considered in the literature, as a local equilibrium for particular choices
of the cost function.
Acknowledgements: This work has been supported by KI-Net NSF RNMS grant No.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Framework
A theory on the evolution of wealth distribution driven by local Nash equilibria in a
conservative economy was developed by the authors in [13] in the framework set up by
[12], which is closely related to Mean-Field Games [8, 20]. By conservative, we meant that
the total wealth is preserved in the time evolution. This assumption enabled us to derive a
large scale dynamics for the evolution of the wealth distribution by using a hydrodynamic
closure with a Nash equilibrium serving as the local thermodynamic equilibrium. This
resulted in a system of gas dynamics-type equations for the density and average wealth of
the agents on large scales. The goal of this paper is to extend this theory to some more
realistic models in non-conservative economies, where global wealth is gained or lost at
a certain rate due to either productivity or inflation. To overcome the difficulty of the
non-conservative property in the hydrodynamic closure, we adapt and develop a concept
of Generalized Collision Invariant (GCI) developed by Degond and Motsch in [14] for
flocking dynamics.
We consider an economy modeled as a closed ensemble of agents. The state of each
agent is described by two variables. The variable x, describes its location in the economic
configuration space X [15]. In addition, the state is described by the wealth y ≥ 0 of
the agent. The dynamic of these attributes is given by some motion mechanism in the
economic configuration variable x and by the exchange of wealth (trading) in the wealth
variable y.
The subject of understanding the wealth distribution has a long history since Pareto
in 1896 [30]. Amoroso in 1925 [1] developed a dynamic equilibrium theory and re-wrote
the Pareto distribution in terms of inverse Gamma distribution. The wealth distribution
results from the combination of two important mechanisms: the first one is the geometric
Brownian motion of finance which has first been proposed by Bachelier in 1900 [3] and the
second one is the trading model, one the earlier ones being that of Edgeworth, dating back
to 1881 [16]. These pioneering works have been followed by numerous authors and have
given rise to the field of econophysics. Recent references on this problem can be found e.g.
in the books [9, 26, 35, 36] and e.g. in the references [21, 34, 29, 37, 39]. The large-scale
dynamics of spatially heterogeneous social models is currently the subject of an intense
research (see e.g. [6], where the authors investigate a spatially heterogeneous version of
Deffuant-Weisbuch opinion model of interacting agents that exhibits a transition between
a socially cohesive phase and a socially disconnected phase).
The basic equation considered in this paper is of the form
∂tf(x, y, t) + ∂x(f V (x, y)) = −∂y(f Ff) + d∂y(∂y(y2f)) ≡ Q(f), (1.1)
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where f(x, y, t) is the density of agents in economic configuration space x having wealth
y at time t. The second term at the right hand side of (1.1) models the uncertainty and
has the form of a diffusion operator corresponding to the geometric Brownian motion of
economy and finance, with variance 2dy2 quadratic in y. The justification of this operator
can be found in [28].
Here Ff describes the control, action or strategy. In [13], the authors take the action
as the negative gradient of the cost function Φf , i.e., Ff = −∂yΦf . A quadratic cost
function with coefficients depending functionally on the density f was used to describe
trading behavior between agents. We write this cost function in general form as
Φf (y) =
1
2
afy
2 + bfy + cf , (1.2)
with coefficients af , bf and cf functionally dependent on the density f .
In the framework of a non-atomic non-cooperative anonymous game with a continuum
of players [2, 22, 32, 33], also known as a Mean-Field Game [8, 20], players interact with
each other to minimize their own cost function. In this paper we consider a more realistic
model, where each player interacts with the ensemble of players, i.e. the market. For each
player, the equilibrium reached under this interaction corresponds to the wealth difference
between him/her and the market average being at one of the minima of this cost function.
We note that this model only considers the exchange of money and does not keep track
of the goods and services traded. Therefore, this game does not mean that each players
wishes to share some of its wealth with the trading partner. Rather, the utility of the
exchange is to maximize the economic action resulting in the optimal exchange of goods
and services. Within this framework, the dynamic of agents following these strategies
can be viewed as given by the following game: each agent follows what is known as the
best-reply strategy, that is, it tries to minimize the cost function with respect to its wealth
variable, assuming that the other agents do not change theirs.
This gives for the control action Ff in (1.1) Ff(y) = −∂yΦf = −afy − bf , and for
the operator Q in (1.1), including effects of uncertainty, given by the geometric Brownian
motion,
Q(f) = ∂y
(
d∂y(y
2f) + (afy + bf )f
)
We consider a closed system, where the number of agents in the market is conserved. So,
equation (1.1) is supplemented by the boundary condition d∂y(y
2f)+(afy+bf)f |y=0 = 0.
In [13, 7], a model resulting from pairwise interactions, proportional to the quadratic
distance between the wealth of the two agents is derived. The goal of the present paper
is to extend this framework to general potentials, particularly to remove the conservation
constraint for the the total wealth
∫
∞
0
yf(y, t) dy. In the following, we refer to this scenario
as a ”non-conservative economy”. In addition, we consider an alternative (and, in some
sense, more realistic) model, where players do not interact with each other in the form of
binary interactions, but with the whole ensemble of players (the market). That is, we do
not consider the mean field limit of a binary interaction model, but start from an inherent
mean field model.
Naturally, one takes moments of the wealth distribution function f with respect to
the wealth variable y. We define the density of agents ρ(x, t) and the density of higher
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order moments of the wealth variable ρΥk(x, t), by:
ρ(x, t) =
∫
f(x, y, t) dy, ρΥk(x, t) =
∫
ykf(x, y, t) dy , k = 1, 2, . . . (1.3)
So, ρ(x, t) is the density of agents in the economic configuration space, ρΥ1(x, t) is the
density of the mean wealth, ρ(Υ2−Υ21) is the density of the variance of the wealth, and so
on. We will restrict the dependence of af , bf , cf in the cost functional Φf to a dependence
on the above defined mean densities Υ1,Υ2, . . ..
1.2 Conservative vs. non-conservative economies
Computing the first three moments of the operator Q in (1.1) gives, using integration by
parts ∫ 
 1y
y2

Q(f)(x, y, t) dy =

 0−afΥ1 − bf
2(d− af )Υ2 − 2bfΥ1

 ρ(x, t)
Consequently, we obtain a hierarchy for the moments of the density function f(x, y, t)
with respect to the wealth variable y. The first three term of the hierarchies are of the
form
∂t


ρ
ρΥ1
ρΥ2
. . .

+ ∂x
∫
V (x, y)f(x, y, t)


1
y
y2
. . .

 dy =


0
−afΥ1 − bf
2(d− af)Υ2 − 2bfΥ1
. . .

 ρ(x, t) . (1.4)
The system (1.4) is of course not closed, since the flux terms on the left hand side of
(1.4) are in general unknown for an arbitrary density function f . The closure of the
hierarchy (1.4) at a certain level has to be performed by some asymptotic analysis and
scaling arguments, which are the subject of this paper. We are faced with a conservative
economy if the dependence of the coefficients in the quadratic cost functional Φf on the
density f are such that afΥ1+bf = 0 holds for any density f . In this case, the total wealth
ρΥ1 is preserved, when integrated over the configuration variable x. So, we consider a
conservative economy, for afΥ1 + bf = 0. In this case, we would have , considering equn.
(1.1), d
dt
∫∫
yf(x, y, t) dxdy = 0, and the total wealth in the economy would be conserved
in time.
The case of a conservative economy (afΥ1 + bf = 0, ∀f , ), i.e. the cost functional
Φf in (1.2) being a parabola, centered around Υ1, has been considered in [15] and, in
a game theoretical framework, in [13]. In this paper, we consider a non - conservative
economy (afΥ1 + bf 6= 0, except in equilibrium) where wealth is generated or lost due to
productivity of the agents or inflation.
1.3 Frequent trading
In this paper we will consider an asymptotic regime, where the dynamics is dominated
by the trading interaction of the agents, i.e. where the operator Q is the dominant
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term in equation (1.1). In the case of a conservative economy (preserving wealth with
afΥ1 + bf = 0, ∀f), this leads to a closed macroscopic system for the variables ρ and
Υ1. This system has been treated in [13] and [15]. The more general form of the collision
operator, with a general potential Φf in (1.2), still preserves the density of agents, so 1
is a collision invariant. (For simplicity we disregard the birth and death of the agents.)
However, the total wealth in the system is no longer necessarily conserved if afΥ1+bf 6= 0
holds, although wealth is conserved in each individual transactions. This is indeed the
main driving force behind the economy and results in non - conservative economy. The
non - conservative case considerably complicates the derivation of a macroscopic evolution
equation for the density ρ(x, t), since it is not possible to use a local conservation law for
the mean wealth density ρΥ1 in the frequent trading limit, as done in [13] and [15].
We address this problem by using the concept of a general collision invariant (GCI), as
introduced in [14]. This yields a macroscopic balance law (which is not conservative) for
the mean wealth density ρ(x, t)Υ1(x, t) in the limit of frequent trading.
The local equilibrium wealth distribution is also a Nash equilibrium for the non-
conservative economy. It is in general computed by solving an infinite dimensional fixed
point problem. However, the fixed point solution cannot be given explicitly for general
coefficients af , bf and cf , in contrast to the previous literature where they could be ex-
pressed in terms of an inverse Gamma distribution [13]. Rather, they are found by solving
a linear partial differential equation together with a finite dimensional fixed point equa-
tion. If multiple solutions to this fixed point equation exist, corresponding to multiple
stable equilibria, this indicates that phase transitions in the wealth distribution are pos-
sible. However, we leave the question of the existence and enumeration of the solutions
to the fixed point equation to future work.
In Section 4 we make a particular modeling choice for the coefficients af and bf in
the cost functional Φ. This choice corresponds to each player interacting with the mar-
ket (”trading”) with a frequency which is inverse proportional to the uncertainty of the
market, i.e. to the variation coefficient of the probability distribution f in (1.1). We
refer to this assumption as the ”risk averse” scenario, which means that traders are more
likely to trade, the better they can predict the development of the market. In addition,
each player tries to achieve an acceptable risk level (given by a constant κ which has to
be matched to actual market data). These choices allow us to express the macroscopic
large time average equations of the distribution of players and their wealth explicitly in
equation (1.4)
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the multi-agent model
for the dynamics of N agents, each interacting with the market (the ensemble of all
agents). This gives the Fokker-Planck equation (1.1) for the effective single agent density
f(x, y, t). In Section 3, the equations are put in dimensionless form and the Gibbs measure
in the frequent trading limit is introduced. We show that the Gibbs measure expresses a
Nash equilibrium, i.e. no player can improve on the cost function by choosing a different
direction in y. In Section 4 we consider the inhomogeneous case. We introduce the GCI
concept in a general setting and then, specify a simplified yet economically relevant setting
where the GCI concept leads to explicit calculations. This leads to an explicit closure of
the moments of the kinetic equation (1.1). The final macroscopic model is summarized
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude by drawing some perspectives in section 6.
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2 Game theoretical framework
We consider a set of N market agents. Each agent, labeled j, is endowed with two
variables: its wealth Yj ∈ R+ and a variable Xj ∈ X , where X is an interval of R. The
variable Xj characterizes the agent’s economic configuration, i.e. the category of agents
it usually interacts with. We ignore the possibility of debts so that we take Yj ≥ 0. We
use notations ~X(t) = (X1, . . . , XN), ~Y (t) = (Y1, . . . , YN) to describes the ensemble of
all agents. To single out the market environment for the j-th agent, we denote Xˆj =
(X1, . . . , Xj−1, Xj+1, . . . , XN) and Yˆj = (Y1, . . . , Yj−1, Yj+1, . . . , YN) for the ensemble of
all agents other than his/her self (note that in game theory, Yˆj is often denoted Y−j).
We also write ~X = (Xj, Xˆj) and ~Y = (Yj, Yˆj) to represent the agent j in the market
environment (Xj , Xˆj, Yj, Yˆj). We denote the cost function for the j-th agent in this market
environment as ΦN (Xj , Xˆj, Yj, Yˆj, t) or Φ
N ( ~X, Yj, Yˆj, t). The best-reply strategy is mostly
used in economy. Each agent tries to minimize the cost function with respect to its
wealth variable, assuming that the other agents do not change theirs. The agents choose
the steepest descent direction of their cost function Yj → ΦN ( ~X, Yj, Yˆj) as their action in
wealth space, i.e.,
FN( ~X, Yj, Yˆj, t) = −∂YjΦN ( ~X, Yj, Yˆj, t)
This action is supplemented with a geometric Brownian noise which models volatility.
The resulting dynamics of the j-th agent is described below
X˙j = V (Xj(t), Yj(t)), (2.5)
dYj = FN( ~X, Yj, Yˆj, t) dt+
√
2d Yj dB
j
t . (2.6)
The stochastic geometric Brownian noise is understood in the Ito` sense and the quantity√
2d is the volatility while the notation Bjt denote independent Brownian motions. The
first equation above describes how fast the agent evolves in the economic configuration
space as a function of its current wealth and current economic configuration and V (x, y)
is a measure of the speed of this motion. We assume that the function V decays to zero
at far field if the domain is unbounded, and that V = 0 holds on the boundary ∂X if the
domain is bounded, i.e.
V → 0 as x→ ∂X , (2.7)
holds.
In this dynamics, the agents would eventually, at large times, reach a point of minimum
of their cost function. This minimum would then be written
Y Nj (
~X, Yˆj, t) = arg min
Yj∈R+
ΦN( ~X, Yj, Yˆj, t), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (2.8)
and corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the agents. Therefore, the dynamics correspond
to a non-cooperative non-atomic anonymous game [2, 22, 32, 33], also known as a Mean-
Field Game [8, 20], where the equilibrium assumption is replaced by a time dynamics
describing the march towards a Nash equilibrium. A game theoretical framework for this
general setting was developed by the authors in [12] and applied to study conservative
economies in [13].
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In this paper we consider a modified, and in some sense more realistic, model where
the cost functional Φ does not depend on the individual values Yˆj of the other agents,
but depends instead on average quantities of the ensemble. This means that agents are
not trading with each other individually, but trade with a market (i.e. the ensemble of
all other agents), still trying to optimize their individual costs. So we consider a cost
functional of the form
ΦN = ΦN( ~X, Yj,Υ), FN = −∂YjΦn
with Υ given by the averaged properties of the ensemble of all agents (the market). (In this
paper, we will take Υ to be the given by the first two moments, corresponding to the mean
and the variance, of the wealth in the whole market. So, Υ = (Υ1,Υ2) = (
∑
k Yk,
∑
k Y
2
k )
holds.) In the limit N →∞, the one-particle distribution function f is then a solution of
the Fokker-Planck equation :
∂tf + ∂x(V (x, y)f) + ∂y(Ff f) = d ∂
2
y
(
y2f
)
, (2.9)
where Ff = Ff(x, y, t) is given by
Ff (x, y, t) = −∂yΦf(t)(x, y) , (2.10)
and Φf depends on the density f only through Υ(f). This equation is posed for (x, y) ∈
X × [0,∞[. We supplement this equation with the no flux boundary condition at y = 0:
d∂y(y
2f)− Ff f |y=0 = 0, ∀x ∈ X , ∀t ∈ R+. (2.11)
With the assumption (2.7) on V , there is no need for any boundary condition on f on
∂X . These conditions imply that the number of agents is conserved in time for the kinetic
system, i.e.
∫
x∈X
∫
y∈[0,∞)
f(x, y, t) dx dy = Constant. We also provide an initial condition
f(x, y, 0) = f0(x, y).
In this paper we consider a specific trading model with the market and take a the
following quadratic cost function with coefficients depending functionally on the ensemble
of agents
Φf (x, y) =
1
2
af(y +
bf
af
)2 + cf − 1
2
b2f
af
=
1
2
afy
2 + bfy + cf , (2.12)
af represents the trading frequency with the market and y = −bf/af represents the
optimum the agent tries to achieve. Note that constant cf plays no role in strategy Ff
and we can set it as b2f/(2af). The cost function (2.12) resembles the structure of the
cost function used in [13], but contains now arbitrary coefficients af and bf . The trading
frequency now is taken to be uniform and depends on the market environment. The
coefficient af will be given an interpretation in the example of the risk-adverse strategy
below. The flexibility in the choice of af and bf in the functional enables us to model
market strategies. Specifically, in Section 4, a risk averse strategy will be taken for af
af =
dΥ2
Υ2 −Υ21
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where Υ1 and Υ2 are the first and second moments of the agent ensemble defined as
above. af/d represents the ratio between strategy action and the volatility and is given
by Υ2/(Υ2 −Υ21), the reciprocal of the variation coefficient of the ~Y . In completely
deterministic market, with no variation, the trading frequency of the agent would be
infinite. On the other hand, in an extremely uncertain market, with an infinite variance,
trading frequency would be given just by the uncertainty introduced by the Brownian
motion, and af = d holds.
3 Dimensionless formulation and the frequent trad-
ing limit
3.1 Dimensionless formulation
One of the main characterization in the evolution of wealth distribution is spatio-temporal
scale separation. The economic interaction (the dynamic in the y-direction) is fast com-
pared to the spatiotemporal scale of the motion in the economic configuration space (i.e.
the x variable). In order to manage the various scales in a proper way, we change the
variables to dimensionless ones. Following the procedure developed in [12], we introduce
the macroscopic scale. We assume that the changes in economic configuration x are slow
compared to the exchanges of wealth between agents. We introduce t0 and x0 = v0t0 the
time and economic configuration space units, with v0 the typical magnitude of V . We
scale the wealth variable y, by a monetary unit y0. Defining xs =
x
x0
, ys =
y
y0
, ts =
t
t0
and
fs(xs, ys, ts) = x0y0f(x, y, t). Correspondingly, we scale the mean wealth density Υ1 and
the velocity V (x, t) by Υ1(x, t) = y0Υ1s(xs, ts) and V (x, t) =
x0
t0
Vs(xs, ts). We scale the
trading frequency parameters af and bf in (1.2) by af =
1
εt0
afs and bf =
y0
εt0
bfs and the
variance d in the geometric Brownian motion by d = 1
εt0
ds, with ε ≪ 1 a small dimen-
sionless parameter. This means, that we consider the frequency of the trading activity,
given by the parameters d, af , bf to be large compared to the frequency of movement
in the economic configuration space, given by the average size v0 of V . This gives the
dimensionless formulation of equation (1.1) as (dropping the subscript s for notational
convenience):
∂tf
ε + ∂x(f
εV (x, y)) =
1
ε
Q(f ε), (3.13)
Q(f) = ∂y [ d ∂y(y
2 f) + (af y + bf ) f ]. (3.14)
In the dimensionless formulation the moment hierarchy (1.4) is still given by
∂t


ρε
ρεΥε1
ρεΥε2
. . .

 + ∂x
∫
V (x, y) f ε(x, y, t)


1
y
y2
. . .

 dy = 1ε


0
−(afεΥε1 + bfε)
2(d− afε)Υε2 − 2bfεΥε1
. . .

 ρε(x, t) .
(3.15)
The left-hand side of (3.15) describes the slow dynamics of the moments of distribution
in the economy configuration variable x and time t. This evolution is driven by the fast,
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local evolution of this distribution as a function of the individual decision variables y
described by the right-hand side. The parameter ε at the denominator highlights that
fact that the internal decision variables evolve on a faster time scale than the external
economy configuration variables. According to [13], the fast evolution of the internal
decision variables drives agents performing a ”rapid march”, i.e. on a O(1
ε
) time scale,
towards a Nash equilibrium, defined by the game of minimizing the functional Φf in (1.2),
up to a diffusion.
3.2 The frequent trading limit and the Gibbs measure
In the limit of frequent trading interaction (when ε in the previous section is small com-
pared to 1), the macroscopic dynamics are given by the shape of the solution of Q(f) = 0.
In the following we will restrict the form of the nonlinear operator Q such that the co-
efficients af and bf in (3.13) depend only on the means of the first 2 moments of the
wealth variable. We define the vector valued functional Υ(f) acting from the space of
distribution functions into R2 via the definition
Υ(f) = (Υ1(f),Υ2(f)), Υk(f) =
∫
ykf(y) dy∫
f(y) dy
, k = 1, 2 .
So, the scaled trading operator Q in (3.13) takes the form Q(f) = C[f,Υ(f)], with the
operator C given by
Q(f) = C[f,Υ(f)] = ∂y[d∂y(y
2f) + (aΥ(f)y + bΥ(f))f ].
We note that, although Q is a nonlinear operator, the nonlinearity is restricted to the
dependence of Q on the mean moments Υ(f). In other words, for a given vector Υ
the operator C[f,Υ] is linear in f . This allows for the definition of a normalized Gibbs
measure GΥ(y) satisfying (for a given vector Υ) the linear problem
C[GΥ,Υ] = ∂y[d∂y(y
2GΥ) + (aΥ y + bΥ)GΥ] = 0,
∫
∞
0
GΥ(y) dy = 1 (3.16)
We reformulate the solution ofQ(f) = 0 as the combination of a linear infinite dimensional
problem (solving the linear PDE (3.16) for a given vector Υ), and a two dimensional fixed
point problem. The computation of the local thermodynamic equilibrium, the solution
of Q(f) = 0,
∫
f dy = 1, is then given by the solution GΥ of (3.16) where the two-
dimensional vector Υ is a solution of the fixed point problem:
Υ(GΥ) = Υ . (3.17)
The shape of the probability distribution f(x, y, t) in the frequent trading limit ε→ 0
is then given by f equ(x, y, t) = ρ(x, t)GΥ(y), with GΥ satisfying (3.16) and Υ satisfying
the fixed point problem (3.17), since multiplying GΥ by a y-independent density ρ(x, t)
does not change the mean moments Υ.
The form (3.16) of the trading operator C[GΥ,Υ] allows for the computation of the
mean moment vector Υ(GΥ) via a recursion formula which is obtained by a simple inte-
gration by parts argument. Integrating equation (3.16) against yk gives, using the zero
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flux boundary condition at y = 0
∫
∞
0
[(aΥ − d(k − 1)) yk + bΥ yk−1]GΥ dy = 0,
∫
∞
0
GΥ(y) dy = 1 ,
and, in particular for the first two moments Υ(GΥ) with k = 1, 2:
aΥΥ1(GΥ) + bΥ = 0, (aΥ − d) Υ2(GΥ) + bΥΥ1(GΥ) = 0 . (3.18)
The fixed point equations (3.17) take then the form
aΥΥ1 + bΥ = 0, (aΥ − d)Υ2 + bΥΥ1 = 0 . (3.19)
• So, the equilibrium solution is computed by first finding all solutions to the fixed
point equation (3.19), i.e. (3.19) plays the role of a constitutive relation for the
moments in local equilibrium.
• For any vector Υ = (Υ1,Υ2) satisfying the constitutive relations (3.19) there exists
a local equilibrium f equ(x, y, t) given by f equ(x, y, t) = ρ(x, t)GΥ(y) with a local
agent density ρ(x, t) and GΥ the solution of problem (3.16).
• The shape of the local equilibrium solution f equ = ρGΥ determines of course the
large time average of the solution, and in turn this shape depends on modeling
the coefficients aΥ and bΥ. So, modeling aΥ and bΥ determines the form of the
macroscopic equations given in Section 4. To obtain macroscopic balance laws, in
addition to the trivial conservation law for the number of agents, the coefficients
aY , bY have to be such that the constitutive relations (3.19) have multiple solutions.
• In [13] and [15] the special case, when aΥ and bΥ depend only on the first moment
Υ1, has been treated. In this case finding the Gibbs measure by solving (3.16), (3.17)
reduces to a linear problem and solutions can be computed explicitly in terms of
inverse Gamma distributions, recovering well known results given c.f. in [1].
• Unfortunately, it turns out that this makes the macroscopic equations trivial, except
in the case of a conservative economy when the coefficients aΥ and bΥ satisfy aΥΥ1+
bΥ = 0.
• In this paper, we therefore consider a more refined model, where the coefficients aΥ
and bΥ depend on Υ1 and Υ2, i.e. on the mean and the variance of the wealth of
the market, which allows for the consideration of non - conservative economies with
aΥΥ1 + bΥ 6= 0.
4 Large time averages and hydrodynamic hierarchy
closures using the Gibbs measure
The goal of this section is to close the hierarchy (3.15) in Section 3 by a local equilibrium,
i.e. by a probability density function f of the form f(x, y, t) = ρ(x, t)GΥ(x,t)(y) with the
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Gibbs measure GΥ(y) computed from the results in Subsection 4.2. For a conservative
economy, where the coefficients aΥ, bΥ are such that aΥΥ1+ bΥ = 0 holds ∀f in equation
(1.4), this is rather straight forward since we immediately obtain two conservation laws
for the density of agents and the mean wealth on large O(1
ε
) time scales. These can be
closed by replacing f(x, y, t) by the local equilibrium density ρ(x, t)GΥ(x,t)(y) in (3.15).
This has been done in the papers [15] and, in a game theoretical framework, in [13]. In
the case of a non - conservative economy aΥΥ1 + bΥ 6= 0, just taking the first moment of
the transport equation 3.13 with respect to y does not yield a macroscopic conservation
law on large time scales, i.e. an equation which is independent of ε. We therefore need to
integrate the transport equation 3.13 against a more sophisticated test function, called a
generalized collision invariant (GCI), proposed in [14].
4.1 The GCI concept
We consider a kinetic equation of the form
∂tf
ε + ∂x(V f
ε) =
1
ε
Q(f ε) (4.20)
with Q(f) a nonlinear operator of the form Q(f) = C[f,Υ(f)]. The mean moment
operator Υ(f) = (Υ1(f), . . . ,ΥK(f)) is defined as in Section 1 by
∫
ykf dy = Υk
∫
f dy,
k = 1, . . . , K. The operator f 7→ C[f,Υ] is linear for a given vector Υ ∈ RK+ . So, the
nonlinear dependence of Q(f) on f is restricted to the nonlinear dependence of C[f,Υ(f)]
on Υ(f). Integrating (4.20) against any test function z(x, y) w.r.t. y gives
∫
z{∂tf ε + ∂x(V f ε)} dy = 1
ε
∫
zQ(f ε) dy , (4.21)
A macroscopic balance law results if
∫
zQ(f) dy = 0. One obvious choice is z = 1,
giving the conservation of the number of agents. In the case of a conservative economy,
with
∫
yQ(f) dy = 0, ∀f , treated in [15] and [13], the other choice is z = y, giving a
set of hydrodynamic type equations on the macroscopic level. The basic idea of a GCI,
developed in [14], is to make the function z dependent on the moments Υ(f) of the kinetic
solution f , such that the right hand side in (4.21) vanishes. This yields a macroscopic
balance law of the form ∫
χΥ(fε) {∂tf ε + ∂x(V f ε)} dy = 0 , (4.22)
if, for any Υ ∈ RK+ , we can find z = χΥ such that∫
χΥC[f,Υ] dy = 0, ∀f such that Υ(f) = Υ holds. (4.23)
Using the special structure of Q(f) = C[f,Υ(f)], this can be achieved by using the
L2-adjoint of the operator f 7→ C[f,Υ]. Let Cadj[g,Υ] be defined by
∫
g C[f,Υ] dy =
∫
f Cadj[g,Υ] dy .
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That χΥ satisfies (4.23) is equivalent to saying that
∃(λ1, . . . , λK) ∈ RK such that Cadj[χΥ,Υ] =
K∑
k=1
λk(Υk − yk) . (4.24)
Then we have ∫
χΥ(f)Q(f) dy =
∫
χΥ(f) C[f,Υ(f)] dy
=
∫
f Cadj[χΥ(f),Υ(f)] dy
=
K∑
k=1
λk
∫
f (Υk(f)− yk) dy = 0 ,
by the definition of Υk(f). So the problem of finding the macroscopic balance laws for
equation (4.20) reduces to finding all the GCI’s i.e. all the solutions of (4.24). For any
given vector Υ, the set of associated GCI forms a linear manifold of dimension M + 1,
with M ≤ K: indeed, the constants are solutions and form a linear space of dimension
1 and the non-constant GCI’s form a linear vector space of dimension M . We can have
M < K since some compatibility conditions between the λk may be required. From now
on, χΥ denotes a vector of M independent non-constant GCI.
If we can prove that the solution of the kinetic equation (4.20) is really given up to
order O(ε) by the equilibrium solution, i.e. if f ε = ρGΥ + εf1 holds, then
∂t(ρGΥ) + ∂x(V ρGΥ) =
1
ε
ρC[GΥ(GΥ+εf1), Υ(GΥ + εf1)] +O(ε) (4.25)
holds. Letting ε → 0 gives an indefinite limit of the form 0
0
on the right hand side of
equation (4.25), since Υ satisfies the constitutive equations Υ(GΥ) = Υ, and C[GΥ,Υ] = 0
holds. Integrating (4.25) against χΥ(ρGΥ+εf1) gives∫
χΥ(ρGΥ+εf1)[∂t(ρGΥ) + ∂x(V ρGΥ)] dy = O(ε) ,
and, in the limit ε→ 0 the closed macroscopic equations
∂tρ+ ∂x(ρ
∫
V (x, y)GΥ dy) = 0,
∫
χΥ[∂t(ρGΥ) + ∂x(V ρGΥ)] dy = 0 , (4.26)
with Υ satisfying the constitutive relations Υ(GΥ) = Υ.
This leads to the following recipe for computing macroscopic balance laws for a kinetic
equation of the form (4.20) with a collision operator Q(f), only conserving the number
of agents, i.e. only satisfying
∫
Q(f) dy = 0, ∀f , but not conserving any additional
moments.
• For a general vector Υ, find the solution of (4.24). Unfortunately, this will have to
be done, in practice, numerically for nontrivial operators Cadj.
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• As pointed out earlier, the Lagrange multipliers λk, k = 1, . . . , K may not be cho-
sen arbitrarily. Indeed, they have to satisfy certain conditions, depending on the
structure of the operator Cadj, such that the GCI equation (4.24) is solvable. We
also repeat that the GCI’s form a linear vector space and that we denote by χΥ a
vector of independent non-constant GCI spanning the space of non-constant GCI.
• This gives in the limit ε → 0 the macroscopic equations, which are independent of
the microscopic variable y and the parameter ε:
∂tρ+ ∂x(
∫
f V (x, y) dy) = 0,
∫
χΥ(f) {∂tf + ∂x(f V (x, y))} dy = 0, (4.27)
with ρ defined as ρ(x, t) =
∫
f(x, y, t) dy. The system (4.27) still has to be closed
by choosing an approximate solution f for the kinetic equation (4.20).
• The system (4.27) is closed by choosing f = f equ = ρGΥ, with GΥ being the Gibbs
measure from Section 4.2 in our case, this choice being justified by the formal limit
ε→ 0 in (4.20).
• To compute the Gibbs measure GΥ in Subsection 4.2, we have to solve the infinite
dimensional problem C[GΥ,Υ] = 0,
∫
GΥ dy = 1, for a general vector Υ, and then
solve the, finite dimensional, fixed point problem Υ(GΥ) = Υ for the vector Υ.
• The final macroscopic equations (4.27) will be of the form
∂tρ+∂x(
∫
ρGΥ V (x, y) dy) = 0,
∫
χΥ {∂t(ρGΥ)+∂x(ρGΥ V )} dy = 0, (4.28)
with Υ satisfying the constitutive relation Υ(GΥ) = Υ.
• For the system (4.28) to be closed, the fixed point equation Υ(GΥ) = Υ should
have a manifold structure, parametrized by as many independent parameters as
independent non-constant GCI. The free parameters in the fixed point equation
Υ(GΥ) = Υ are essentially the other dependent variable (besides ρ) in the system
(4.28), although it it might never be explicitly expressed, but given implicitly by
the constitutive equations. In the example of the risk-adverse strategy below, the
variables are the density and the mean wealth (meaning that the constitutive relation
has only a one-parameter family of solutions, parametrized by the mean wealth)
and the macroscopic system consists of the density conservation equation and a
non-conservative balance equation for the mean-wealth.
4.2 Non-conservative economies with risk averse trading strate-
gies
In the model, considered in this paper, individual agents try to minimize the cost func-
tional ΦΥ(f)(y) with
ΦΥ(y) =
1
2
aΥy
2 + bΥy + cΥ =
1
2
aΥ(y +
bΥ
aΥ
)2 + cΥ − 1
2
b2Υ
aΥ
,
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given market conditions represented by the density f . So, aΥ represents (in dimensionless
variables) the frequency of the trades with the market, i.e. the strategy of an agent to
trade or not to trade, and y = − bΥ
aΥ
represents the (market dependent) optimum, the
agent tries to achieve. We consider a risk averse strategy of the form
aΥ =
dΥ2
Υ2 −Υ21
, (4.29)
and refer to the end of Section 2 for its interpretation. The constant in the potential does
not influence the dynamics and we can take cΥ − 12
b2Υ
aΥ
= 0. We choose the coefficient bΥ
such that,
bΥ = −(1 + κ) dΥ1, (4.30)
with a fixed constant κ > 0. This choice is motivated by the consideration of the Nash
equilibrium below.
Using the choice (4.29) for aΥ, we compute the Gibbs measure introduced in Sec-
tion 3 3.2 from C[GΥ,Υ] = 0,
∫
GΥ dy = 1, i.e. from equation (3.16). It yields the
constitutive relations for the vector Υ = (Υ1,Υ2) from the recursion formula (3.18) as
dΥ2
Υ2 −Υ21
Υ1 + bΥ = 0, (
dΥ2
Υ2 −Υ21
− d) Υ2 + bΥΥ1 = Υ1 ( dΥ1Υ2
Υ2 −Υ21
+ bΥ) = 0 . (4.31)
Since the two equations involved in (4.31) are the same, up to a multiplicative factor Υ1,
the first Eq. (4.31) yields the constitutive relation. For any choice of bΥ (and in particular,
for the choice given by (4.30)), this equation is one equation in two unknowns Υ1,Υ2 and
has a one parameter family of solutions.
Now, using the first equation (4.31) together with (4.30), we obtain
Υ2
Υ2 −Υ21
= − bΥ
dΥ1
= 1 + κ, or equivalently Υ2 −Υ21 =
1
κ
Υ21. (4.32)
This means that, at the Nash equilibrium when every player has optimized its cost func-
tional, there exists a finite amount of risk in the market, measured by the fraction 1
κ
of
the squared mean wealth Υ21. So, the choice (4.30) is equivalent to choosing some desired
global risk, i.e. a global variation coefficient 1
κ
in the equilibrium market. The first Eq.
(4.32) leads to the following relation between Υ1 and Υ2 at equilibrium:
Υ2 =
1 + κ
κ
Υ21 . (4.33)
which is the form taken by the constitutive relation (3.19) in the present example.
To arrive at the closed macroscopic system (4.28) we still have to compute the Gibbs
measure GΥ and the GCI χΥ for a general vector Υ = (Υ1,Υ2), satisfying the constitutive
relations (4.33). The Gibbs measure is given, according to equation (3.16) by the solution
of
∂y[d ∂y(y
2GΥ) + (
dΥ2
Υ2 −Υ21
y − dΥ1 (1 + κ))GΥ] = 0,
∫
∞
0
GΥ(y) dy = 1 , (4.34)
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with Υ satisfying (4.33). Using the constitutive relations (4.33) this gives
∂y[d ∂y (y
2GΥ) + d (1 + κ) (y −Υ1)GΥ] = 0,
∫
∞
0
GΥ(y) dy = 1 , (4.35)
together with the zero flux boundary condition d ∂y (y
2GΥ)+d (1+κ) (y−Υ1)GΥ|y=0 = 0,
which guarantees the conservation of the number of agents in the system. The solution
of (4.35) is given by
GΥ(y) =
1
cΥ
y−κ−3 e−
(1+κ)Υ1
y , cΥ =
∫
∞
0
y−κ−3 e−
(1+κ) Υ1
y dy . (4.36)
GΥ is therefore given by an inverse Gamma distribution, i.e.
GΥ(y) = gκ+2,(1+κ)Υ1(y)
where the inverse Gamma distribution gα,β is defined as gα,β =
βα
Γ(α)
y−1−αe−
β
y with shape
parameter α and scale parameter β and Γ(α) denoting the Euler Gamma function eval-
uated at α. It is related to the usual Gamma function Γ by: γα,β(z) =
βα
Γ(α)
zα−1e−βz by
the change of variables z = 1
y
. This distribution has been previously found in [7]. When
y is large, the distribution becomes the Pareto power law distribution, which has a very
strong agreement with economic data (see e.g. the review in [39]). GΥ(y) = gκ+2,(1+κ)Υ1(y)
represent the large time average (i.e. the Nash equilibrium) of a game of players, where
each player tries to play the market to achieve a desired risk, given by the constitutive
relation (4.33), which is a dimensionless measure of the uncertainty of the market. We
also note that, in order for the local equilibrium distribution GΥ to have a finite variance,
i.e.
∫
∞
0
y2GΥ dy <∞, the value of κ in (4.36) should be positive (κ > 0).
4.3 The GCI for risk-adverse trading strategies
Let Υ = (Υ1,Υ2) be given, not necessarily related by the constitutive relation (4.33).
With the choices (4.29), (4.30), Eq. (4.24) is written:
∂y
(
y2GΥ∂yψ
)
= λ1(y −Υ1)GΥ + λ2(y2 −Υ2)GΥ. (4.37)
The weak formulation of this equation is
∫
∞
0
y2GΥ ∂yψ ∂yσ = −
∫
∞
0
λ1(y −Υ1)GΥ σ dy −
∫
∞
0
λ2(y
2 −Υ2)GΥ σ dy, (4.38)
for all σ. We note that the formalism of the paper [13] and particularly of its Lemma
3.5 applies. It uses an appropriate functional setting, and we refer the reader to[13] for
the details. In [13], it is shown that a solution to (4.38) exists if and only if the following
solvability condition (whose necessity is easily found by taking σ = 1) is satisfied:
∫
∞
0
λ1(y −Υ1)GΥ dy +
∫
∞
0
λ2(y
2 −Υ2)GΥ dy = 0,
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or in other words:
λ1 (Υ1(GΥ)−Υ1) + λ2(Υ2(GΥ)−Υ2) = 0. (4.39)
Now, we define
χΥ =
y2
2
−Υ1 y, (4.40)
Using (4.34) (and not (4.35) because we do not suppose the constitutive relation (4.33)
to be satisfied), we get
∂y
(
y2GΥ∂yχΥ
)
=
Υ1
Υ2 −Υ21
{
−Υ1(y2 −Υ2) + Υ2
(
1 + (1 + κ)
(
1− Υ
2
1
Υ2
))
(y −Υ1)
}
GΥ.(4.41)
This equation is of the form (4.37) with
λ1 =
Υ1
Υ2 −Υ21
Υ2
(
1 + (1 + κ)
(
1− Υ
2
1
Υ2
))
, λ2 = − Υ1
Υ2 −Υ21
Υ1.
With the help of (3.18) to compute Υk(GΥ), k = 1, 2, we immediately verify that the
constraint (4.39) is satisfied. From (4.39), it follows that the space of non-constant GCI is
of dimension 1 and since χΥ is a non-constant GCI, all non-constant GCi are proportional
to χΥ.
4.4 The equation for the mean wealth
Thanks to (4.40), the second Eq. (4.28) is given by:
∫
∞
0
(y2
2
−Υ1(x, t) y
)
∂t(ρGΥ) dy +
∫
∞
0
(y2
2
−Υ1(x, t) y
)
∂x(V (x, y) ρGΥ) dy = 0.(4.42)
This gives
∂t
∫
∞
0
(y2
2
−Υ1 y
)
ρGΥ dy + ∂tΥ1
∫
∞
0
y ρGΥ dy
+ ∂x
∫
∞
0
(y2
2
−Υ1 y
)
V ρGΥ dy + ∂xΥ1
∫
∞
0
y V ρGΥ dy = 0. (4.43)
We also remind the mass conservation equation (the first Eq. (4.28)). We define:
Uk(x; Υ1) =
(∫ ∞
0
V (x, y)GΥ(y) y
k dy
)∣∣∣
Υ2=
1+κ
κ
Υ21
, k ∈ N, (4.44)
and we get
∂tρ+ ∂x(ρU0) = 0 . (4.45)
Now, we have, thanks to (4.33),
∂t
∫
∞
0
(y2
2
−Υ1 y
)
ρGΥ dy + ∂tΥ1
∫
∞
0
y ρGΥ dy = −1− κ
2κ
Υ21 ∂x(ρU0) +
1
κ
ρΥ1∂tΥ1.(4.46)
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and
∂x
∫
∞
0
(y2
2
−Υ1 y
)
V ρGΥ dy + ∂xΥ1
∫
∞
0
y V ρGΥ dy = ∂x
(
ρ
U2
2
)−Υ1 ∂x(ρU1).(4.47)
Inserting (4.46), (4.47), into (4.43), we finally get the equation for the mean wealth Υ1:
ρ∂tΥ1 +
κ
2Υ1
∂x(ρU2)−
[
κ ∂x(ρU1) +
1− κ
2
Υ1 ∂x(ρU0)
]
= 0. (4.48)
5 The macroscopic model
To summarize, the macroscopic model is the following system for the agent density ρ(x, t)
and the local mean wealth Υ1(x, t):
∂tρ+ ∂x(ρU0) = 0, (5.49)
ρ∂tΥ1 +
κ
2Υ1
∂x(ρU2)−
[
κ ∂x(ρU1) +
1− κ
2
Υ1 ∂x(ρU0)
]
= 0. (5.50)
with
Uk = Uk(x; Υ1) =
(∫ ∞
0
V (x, y)GΥ(y) y
k dy
)∣∣∣
Υ2=
1+κ
κ
Υ21
, k = 0, 1, 2. (5.51)
It could be further simplified by assuming specific values of V (x, y). We leave this to
future work.
6 Conclusions
We have derived a model for the large time averages of a set of agents, interacting with
each other through a market, and moving around in an abstract configuration space. Each
player interacts with the market (”trades”) with a frequency which is inverse proportional
to the uncertainty of the market, and tries to achieve an acceptable risk (given by a
constant κ which has to be matched to actual market data). The model does not rely
on the assumption of conservation of the total wealth in the system, but instead uses the
concept of generalized collision invariants to derive macroscopic equations for the large
time averages. In this sense, this paper is a generalization, as well as an alternative,
to previously considered models in [7], [12], [15], where only binary trading interactions
between individual agents have been considered under the assumption of conservation of
the total wealth in the system. The final macroscopic model consists of a conservation law
for the number of agents in the system and a balance law for the mean and the variance
of the total wealth, supplemented by a constitutive relation for mean and variance. So,
in the large time limit, agents move in configuration space (which is assumed to be one
dimensional in this paper for the sake of notational simplicity) according to two partial
differential equations (5.49), (5.50) in time and one spatial variable.
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